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ABSTRACT
Touchscreen mobile devices are becoming commodities as the wide
adoption of pervasive computing. These devices allow users to ac-
cess various services at anytime and anywhere. In order to pre-
vent unauthorized access to these services, passwords have been
pervasively used in user authentication. However, password-based
authentication has intrinsic weakness in password leakage. This
threat could be more serious on mobile devices, as mobile devices
are widely used in public places.
Most prior research on improving leakage resilience of pass-
word entry focuses on desktop computers, where speciﬁc restric-
tions on mobile devices such as small screen size are usually not
addressed. Meanwhile, additional features of mobile devices such
as touch screen are not utilized, as they are not available in the
traditional settings with only physical keyboard and mouse. In
this paper, we propose a user authentication scheme named Cover-
Pad for password entry on touchscreen mobile devices. CoverPad
improves leakage resilience by safely delivering hidden messages,
which break the correlation between the underlying password and
the interaction information observable to an adversary. It is also de-
signed to retain most beneﬁts of legacy passwords, which is critical
to a scheme intended for practical use. The usability of Cover-
Pad is evaluated with an extended user study which includes addi-
tional test conditions related to time pressure, distraction, and men-
tal workload. These test conditions simulate common situations for
a password entry scheme used on a daily basis, which have not been
evaluated in the prior literature. The results of our user study show
the impacts of these test conditions on user performance as well as
the practicability of the proposed scheme.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing And Information Systems]:
Security and Protection— Authentication; H.5.2 [Information
Interfaces and Presentation]: User Interfaces— Evalua-
tion/methodology, User-centered design, Haptic I/O
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices are becoming essential tools in modern life,
which seamlessly connect human beings to the cyberspace. A user
can now use his smartphone or tablet to access not only general in-
formative services but also sensitive services such as mobile bank-
ing and corporate services. In order to prevent unauthorized access
to these services, user authentication is required to verify the iden-
tity of a user. Among existing user authentication mechanisms,
passwords are still the most pervasive due to their signiﬁcant ad-
vantage in usability over other alternatives such as smartcards and
biometrics [28]. However, password-based user authentication has
intrinsic weakness in password leakage, which may lead to ﬁnan-
cial loss or corporate data disclosure. This threat could be more
serious in scenarios when mobile devices are involved, as mobile
devices are widely used in public places.
Password leakage is a classic problem in password-based authen-
tication. Since password leakage usually happens during authenti-
cation when a user inputs his password, we focus on the problem
of improving leakage resilience of password entry in this work.
Most prior research [19, 27, 38, 39, 5, 26, 33, 13, 24] on this
problem focuses on desktop computers, where speciﬁc restrictions
on mobile devices are usually not addressed. These restrictions
mainly include: 1) a mobile device usually has a smaller screen
size than a desktop computer; 2) a mobile device needs to be oper-
able in non-stationary environments such as on public transit. On
the other hand, mobile devices provide additional features such as
touch screen, which may not be available in traditional settings.
These new features can be utilized to support advanced security
properties that were difﬁcult to achieve before.
In this paper, we propose a concise yet effective authentication
scheme named CoverPad, which is designed for password entry
on touchscreen mobile devices. CoverPad improves leakage re-
silience of password entry while retaining most beneﬁts of legacy
passwords. Leakage resilience is achieved by utilizing the gesture
detection feature of touch screen in forming a cover for user in-
puts. This cover is used to safely deliver hidden messages, which
break the correlation between the underlying password and the in-
teraction information observable to an adversary. From the other
perspective, our scheme is also designed to retain the beneﬁts pro-
vided by legacy passwords. This requirement is critical, as Bon-
neau et al. [10] conclude that any user authentication is unlikely
to gain traction if it does not retain comparable beneﬁts of legacy
passwords. Our scheme approaches this requirement by involving
only intuitive cognitive operations and requiring no extra devices
in the design.
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We implement three variants of CoverPad and evaluate them
with an extended user study. This study includes additional test
conditions related to time pressure, distraction, and mental work-
load. These test conditions simulate common situations for a daily-
used password entry scheme, which have not been evaluated in the
prior literature. We design new experiments to examine their inﬂu-
ence based on previous work in psychology literature [23, 12, 21].
Experimental results show the inﬂuence of these conditions on user
performance and the practicability of our proposed scheme.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• We propose CoverPad to protect password entry on touch-
screen mobile devices. It achieves leakage resilience and re-
tains most beneﬁts of legacy passwords by involving only
intuitive cognitive operations and requiring no extra devices.
• We implement three variants of CoverPad to address differ-
ent user preferences. Our user study shows the practicability
of these variants.
• We extend user study methodology to examine the inﬂuence
of various additional test conditions. Among these condi-
tions, time pressure and mental workload are shown to have
signiﬁcant impacts on user performance. Therefore, it is rec-
ommended to include these conditions in the evaluation of
user authentication schemes in the future.
2. THREAT MODEL
Passwords are the most pervasive user authentication that allows
a human user to be authenticated to a (local or remote) computer
server. Password leakage is a threat that a user’s password is di-
rectly disclosed or indirectly inferred. It usually happens during
password entry, when a user inputs his password in order to prove
his identity. In the case of legacy passwords, a user directly enters
his plaintext password so that the password may be captured via
various eavesdropping attacks including key logger, hidden camera,
and malware. We classify these attacks into two types, external or
internal, according to whether an adversary can access the internal
states of a device for password entry, such as device memory.
An external eavesdropping attack is an attack exploiting a leak-
age channel outside a device. This type of attacks includes vision-
based eavesdropping such as hidden camera, haptics-based eaves-
dropping such as physical key logger, and acoustics-based eaves-
dropping such as tone analysis. Compared to traditional scenarios
involving only desktop computers, an adversary has more oppor-
tunities to launch an external eavesdropping attack against mobile
devices, as mobile devices are widely used in public places. In a
crowded area, an adversary may observe password entry in a close
distance without being noticed (see Figure 1).
User Interaction during 
Password Entry
Leakage
channels
Vision: screen display, 
finger movement, etc.
Haptics: touched
position, etc.
Acoustics: key-press
sound, etc.
Figure 1: Attack scenarios
For vision-based attacks, an adversary may infer the actual pass-
word by observing the movement of ﬁngers even without direct
line-of-sight on the screen display. This capability is signiﬁcantly
enhanced with emerging augmented-reality accessory like Google
Glass [18], which is a small wearable glass transferring real-time
video captured by a tiny camera to a server and displaying the ana-
lyzed results received from the server.
Haptics-based attacks are most likely to happen when users use
public mobile devices. Mobile devices, such as iPad, have been
used as public computer kiosks as observed in museums, restau-
rants, and hotels [22, 20, 41]. In addition, many existing kiosks are
also equipped with touch screen similar to mobile devices. This
provides an incentive for an adversary to install a physical “touch”
logger. Although such touch logger has not been observed in the
wild, it is technically feasible to implement as other physical key
loggers [36]. Considering that the thickness of touch screen in
Samsung Galaxy S3 is just 1.1mm [2], it may not be noticeable
to users if an extra physical touch logger is installed on a normal
touch screen.
The effectiveness of acoustics-based attacks depends on whether
user actions can be distinguished by their tone patterns. For exam-
ple, different tones are played when a user dials different numbers
on an old-style phone. Due to environmental noises, acoustics-
based attacks are usually not as effective as vision-based attacks
and haptics-based attacks.
The other type of attacks that cause password leakage is the in-
ternal eavesdropping attack. Such attacks exploit a leakage channel
inside a device, where an adversary is allowed to access the internal
states such as reading device memory. This type of attacks include
logic key logger, malware, and network eavesdropping, which are
common to all password-based user authentication schemes. Like
most prior research [26, 33, 13, 15, 24, 8, 7], our scheme design
does not address these attacks for the following reasons: 1) Exist-
ing solutions [30, 3, 6, 37] such as application sandbox are available
to effectively defend against these attacks, though it takes time for
them to replace legacy vulnerable systems; 2) these solutions are
independent on user interaction during password entry so that they
can be adapted to any user authentication schemes. Compared to
external eavesdropping attacks, the threat from internal eavesdrop-
ping attacks can be effectively mitigated if a user uses a computer
system that is properly updated and conﬁgured [16], while it is not
easy to defend against external eavesdropping attacks as they are
caused by inevitable exposure of human interaction during pass-
word entry. These external eavesdropping attacks impose realistic
threats leading to password leakage. We will thus focus on external
eavesdropping attacks in our scheme design.
Besides the above attacks which happen during password entry,
password leakage may also be caused by other types of attacks in-
cluding social engineering and phishing [28]. Although their mit-
igation technologies such as secure URL checker and spam ﬁlter
have been widely deployed in modern computer systems, some of
these attacks may not be completely preventable by technical solu-
tions alone. Another example is the database reading attack, where
the back-end databases are intruded so that all user passwords are
compromised. Since these attacks are orthogonal to the password
entry problem, they are out of the scope of this paper.
3. COVERPAD DESIGN
In this section, we present the design of CoverPad. First, we
describe our design objectives from both security and usability per-
spectives. Then, we introduce the conceptual design of CoverPad.
Lastly, we present three variants in implementing CoverPad.
3.1 Design Objectives
CoverPad is designed to improve leakage resilience of password
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entry while retaining most beneﬁts of legacy passwords. We de-
scribe our design objectives as follows.
First, in terms of security, a scheme should minimize password
leakage during password entry under realistic settings. To achieve
this objective, a user should 1) input obfuscated response derived
from his password, and/or 2) input his password in a protected
environment. A recent study [40] shows strong evidence on the
infeasibility of using obfuscated response solely based on human
cognitive capabilities. Therefore, it is necessary to rely on certain
protected environment to achieve this security objective. However,
a fully protected environment may be difﬁcult to establish in prac-
tice, which requires to protect all messages delivered between user
and server. Therefore, we choose a hybrid solution in our scheme
design, where the requirement on a protected environment is sig-
niﬁcantly reduced with the assistance of simple obfuscation. Such
environment is referred to as partially protected environment.
In the presence of a partially protected environment, it is possi-
ble to achieve the optimal security objective – no password leak-
age. As long as the partially protected environment is not compro-
mised, CoverPad provides the same leakage resilience as one-time
pad [31], where the most efﬁcient attacks for an adversary to learn
the password are online dictionary attacks. We will show how this
security objective is achieved in our scheme in the following sec-
tions.
Second, in terms of usability, a scheme should preserve the ben-
eﬁts of legacy passwords in order to gain traction [10]. The major
beneﬁts of legacy passwords include no extra devices required, and
only intuitive cognitive operations performed. We further consider
additional restrictions on mobile devices including that 1) a mo-
bile device usually has a smaller screen size compared to a desk-
top computer; 2) a mobile device needs to be operable in a non-
stationary environment such as on public transit. So we minimize
the number of visual elements that are displayed simultaneously on
the screen, and also simplify the involved operations to make them
suitable in a non-stationary environment.
3.2 Conceptual Design
The conceptual design of CoverPad is shown in Figure 2, where
a hidden transformation Ti(·) is a random mapping Ω → Ω, where
Ω is the set of all individual elements contained in the password
alphabet.
Setup:
A server and a user agree on a k-length password pwd =
(a1, a2, . . . , ak), where a password element ai = pwd[i] be-
longs to an alphabet with size w. It is allowed that ai = aj ,
for i = j.
Password Entry:
For each i from [1, k]:
Step 1: The touch screen shows a keypad with all the ele-
ments in the alphabet.
Step 2: The user is asked to perform a hand-shielding ges-
ture to read the hidden transformation Ti(·) protected by the
hand-shielding gesture. Ti(·) will immediately disappear if
the gesture is no longer detected.
Step 3: The user clicks on response element ei, where ei =
Ti(ai) = (ai + ri mod w), where ri is a random number
drawn from a uniform distribution. A new random number ri
is generated for each round i. The hand-shielding gesture is
not required for this step.
Figure 2: Conceptual design of CoverPad
An example of using CoverPad is given as follows. Suppose a
user has a k-length password. At the beginning of password entry,
the user performs the hand-shielding gesture to view the current
hidden transformation T1 for the ﬁrst character a1 in his password.
Then, he applies T1 to a1 and enters the transformed response e1.
This procedure repeats for each password element ai. During the
whole password entry, Ti disappears immediately once the gesture
is not being detected. A user can always view Ti by performing the
gesture again before inputting ei.
Figure 3: The hand-shielding gesture and its effectiveness
Figure 3 shows how to correctly perform a hand-shielding ges-
ture. This gesture restricts the vision channel to a small visual cone.
This visual cone is not accessible to an adversary unless the adver-
sary’s eyes are close enough to the user’s head, which makes the ad-
versary easily exposed. A hidden camera near the line of sight may
help capture the hidden transformation. However, it needs to be
adjusted according to the user’s height and current position, which
may lead to user’s awareness. On the other hand, the observable re-
sponses for the same password element are uniformly randomized.
Thus, CoverPad is also immune to haptics-based eavesdropping.
Further analysis is provided in the next section.
Therefore, it is difﬁcult to compromise the partially protected
environment formed by the hand-shielding gesture from external
eavesdropping attacks in practice, though the use of this gesture is
simple. If the protective gesture is not being detected by the touch
screen, the hidden transformation will not be displayed such that
the hidden transformation is always protected under the required
gesture. Note that a hidden transformation alone does not leak any
information about the password. As long as the hidden transfor-
mation is not revealed together with the corresponding response,
observed interaction provides no valuable information for an ad-
versary to infer the actual password. A proof about this security
property will be given in Section 4.
3.3 Implementation Variants
We provide three variants of CoverPad that implement differ-
ent features tailored for users with various skill sets, which are de-
scribed and illustrated as follows (see Figure 4).
3.3.1 NumPad-Add
In NumPad-Add, the alphabet of password consists of digits 0
to 9 only. The hidden transformation is performed by adding a
random digit to the current password element and then mod 10 if
the sum is larger than 9, where the value of the random digit ranges
from 0 to 9. For example, the correct response for the ﬁrst round
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Figure 4: Demonstration of three implementation variants
is 6 = (9 + 7) mod 10 given password 934567 and the hidden
message ‘plus 7’.
3.3.2 NumPad-Shift
In NumPad-Shift, the alphabet of password consists of digits 0
to 9 only. The hidden transformation is performed by shifting the
location of the current password element byX-offset and Y -offset,
where the offset values are randomly taken from {−1, 0, 1} forX-
offset, and {−1, 0, 1, 2} for Y -offset. For a 3 × 4 keypad design
shown in Figure 4(b), the transformed response for ai is calculated
as pad[x(ai) + Δx mod 3][y(ai) + Δy mod 4], where Δx is
the X-offset, Δy is the Y -offset, and x(ai) is the X-index of ai,
and y(ai) is the Y -index of ai. For example, the correct response
for the ﬁrst round is 5 if the password is 934567 and the hidden
message is ‘move left by 1 step and move up by 1 step’.
Note that two extra keys ∗ and # are added to the keypad; oth-
erwise, the distribution of hidden transformations is not uniform
on the keypad layout. The proof for the necessity of these two
keys is given as follows. Assuming ∗ and # keys are removed,
the keypad now contains only 10 keys for digits 0 to 9. To pro-
vide a full transformation from a secret key to a random key, the
minimum value set is {−1, 0, 1} for X-offsets and {−1, 0, 1, 2}
for Y -offsets. There are twelve combinations between X-offsets
and Y -offsets, but only ten keys on the keypad. If the offset val-
ues are drawn from a uniform distribution, certain response keys
for a given password element would have a higher frequency com-
pared to others (it is similar as placing twelve balls in ten buckets
in a deterministic way). The exact distribution of response keys
is decided by the underlying password element, thus it discloses
valuable information about the password. From the other perspec-
tive, if response keys are drawn from a uniform distribution, the
offset values will not be uniformly distributed due to similar rea-
son. Therefore, it is necessary to add these two extra keys to the
NumPad-Shift keypad.
3.3.3 LetterPad-Shift
In LetterPad-Shift, the alphabet of password consists of letters a
to z and digits 0 to 9 (36 elements in total). The hidden transforma-
tion is the same as NumPad-Shift. The offset values are randomly
taken from {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3} for both X-offset and Y -offset for
a 6 × 6 keypad design. The transformed response for ai is calcu-
lated as pad[x(ai)+Δx mod 6][y(ai)+Δy mod 6] in a similar
way as for NumPad-Shift. A background grid is added to ease the
calculation of shifting, as shown in Figure 4(c).
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS
4.1 External Eavesdropping Attacks
Common external eavesdropping attacks leading to password
leakage may exploit vision, haptics, or acoustics channel as ana-
lyzed in Section 2. For CoverPad, an adversary using these attacks
can observe at most a complete response key sequence pressed by
a user, while the hidden transformation is protected by our design.
From this key sequence, the adversary knows the i-th pressed key
is decided by the i-th element in the password. However, the ad-
versary cannot further infer what the i-th password element is, as
proved as follows.
Proof: Given a pressed key ei, and two password elements ax and
ay in a w-sized password alphabet, let Pr(ei|ax) and Pr(ei|ay)
be the probabilities for ei being pressed when the underlying pass-
word element are ax and ay , respectively. We have Pr(ei|ax) =
Pr(ei = ax + ri mod w) = Pr(ri = ei − ax mod w) =
Pr(ri = C mod w) = 1/w = Pr(ei|ay) for any i, x, and y,
where C is a constant integer randomly drawn from a uniform dis-
tribution. Therefore, a sequence of pressed keys observed by an
adversary is equivalent to a random sequence, which is similar to a
ciphertext generated by a one-time pad. 
In a partially protected environment where the hidden trans-
formation is protected by the hand-shielding gesture, our scheme
achieves no password leakage. As long as the hidden transforma-
tion is not disclosed together with the corresponding response, an
adversary cannot infer any information about the underlying pass-
word (except password length) even after an inﬁnite number of ob-
servations.
4.2 Side-channel Attacks
In reality, it is possible for an adversary to exploit subtle side-
channels to collect password information during password entry.
These attacks are not usually considered in common threat mod-
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Figure 5: Timing deviations and distributions for entering each password element. The results of NumPad-Shift are similar to the
results of NumPad-Add shown in these ﬁgures.
els [19, 27, 38, 39, 5, 26, 33, 13, 15, 24, 8, 7]. A typical side-
channel attack is timing analysis [35], which analyzes the patterns
in the response time of entering individual password elements. The
preliminary results of our scheme against timing analysis are given
in Figure 5. For the timing deviation shown in Figure 5(a) and 5(b),
each bar with x-value i represents the average response time for en-
tering the transformed responses for a speciﬁc password element i.
For the timing distribution shown in Figure 5(c), each line in the
ﬁgure represents the distribution of the response time for entering
the transformed responses for a speciﬁc password element. These
results show the range and the distribution of the response time for
entering different password elements are almost overlapped. This
indicates that timing analysis is not a major concern for our scheme,
though it is difﬁcult to completely prevent such attacks due to in-
evitable human behavior patterns during password entry. Detailed
analysis on side channel attacks is out of the scope of this paper.
5. USABILITY EVALUATION
5.1 Methodology
The participants in our user study are recruited from undergrad-
uate students in our university. There are 61 participants in total,
30 male and 31 female, with age range between 20 and 25. These
participants come from ﬁve different departments, in which 42 of
them have a social science or business related background, and the
remaining have a computer science or information technology re-
lated background. Each participant is paid with 10 dollars as com-
pensation for their time. We establish a ranking system from which
a participant can see a performance score representing how well he
performs compared to other participants. This ranking system pro-
vides a moderate level of motivation for the participants to do their
best in tests. A numerical identiﬁer is assigned to each participant
in order to protect user privacy.
The user study is conducted in a quiet room. The experiments
use a within-objects design. Each participant is asked to use all
three variants as three test groups. These variants are implemented
on Apple iPad, which are referred to as schemes in this section. The
order of the schemes is randomized to avoid the learning effect that
affects the performance for a speciﬁc scheme. For each test group, a
user is required to memorize a randomly generated password in the
beginning. The password strength is set to be equivalent to 6-digit
PIN, where the password length is four for LetterPad-Shift, and
six for both NumPad-Shift and NumPad-Add. The same password
will be used for the same test group and a “show my password”
button is provided in case a participant forgot his password. The
participants learn how to use a scheme by an interactive step-by-
step tutorial. The participants are required to go through the whole
tutorial for the ﬁrst scheme appearing in the tests, and they may
skip the tutorial for the second and third schemes after learning the
basic scheme design. In the end of each tutorial, there is a short
pretest for the participant to exercise. If a participant fails to pass
the pretest, the researchers will provide help to him to ensure that
he understands how to use the scheme before the tests start.
In each test group, there are six tests simulating additional test
conditions that evaluate the inﬂuence of time pressure, distraction,
and mental workload. The details of these test conditions are de-
scribed in the next subsection. The order of these tests is also ran-
domized in order to avoid the learning effect.
All three test groups consist of 18 tests in total. To avoid the
participants from feeling exhausted and bored, each test is designed
to be short and can be ﬁnished within one or two minutes. The
participants are given a short break after each test group. At the end
of the user study, the participants are given a questionnaire using 5-
point Likert scale to collect their perception on the schemes. The
whole user study takes 35 ∼ 50 minutes to complete.
5.2 Simulating Various Test Conditions
In order to simulate various test conditions related to time pres-
sure, distraction, and mental workload, we introduce two extra ex-
perimental tools, timer and secondary task. A timer is used to create
time pressure by showing a participant howmuch time is left for the
current test condition. It is implemented as a progress bar whose
length increases every second with a countdown text ﬁeld show-
ing how many seconds are left. Secondary tasks are used to sim-
ulate unexpected distraction and persistent mental workload. We
use CRT (choice reaction time) tasks as secondary tasks, which is a
standard technology in experimental psychology [23, 12, 21]. CRT
tasks usually work as secondary tasks that occupy the central ex-
ecutive1 in human brain when evaluating the performance of a pri-
mary task in the presence of a secondary task. CRT tasks require
participants to give distinct responses for each possible stimulus. In
our implementation, the participants are asked to press the correct
button among N buttons, where the correct button should have the
same color as the stimulus. For example, if the stimulus shows a red
button, a participant should press the red button among N buttons
with different colors. We useN = 2 for tests in the distraction con-
dition as the major focus is to unexpectedly disrupt password entry
with a CRT task. We use N = 8 for tests in the mental workload
condition so as to create a considerable mental workload, which is
the same as in the classic Jensen Box setting [23].
Based on the above experimental tools, we simulate six test con-
ditions for each test group by combining the two modes and three
statuses. Two modes related to a timer are described as follows:
• Relaxed mode: A participant is asked to minimize the error
rate in a ﬁxed number of login attempts where time is not
1The central executive is a control system that mediates attention
and regulation of processes occurring in working memory [4].
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considered in performance score calculation. The number of
login attempts is 5 for no-extra-task status and 3 for distrac-
tion and mental workload statuses.
• Timedmode: A participant is asked to perform as many suc-
cessful logins as possible within 1 minute, where both time
and accuracy are considered in performance score calcula-
tion. The countdown of a timer creates time pressure.
Three statuses related to secondary tasks are described as fol-
lows:
• No-extra-task status: A participant is asked to perform the
login task only.
• Distraction status: A simple CRT task may appear with 1/3
probability each time when a participant presses a response
key. This task is used to create unexpected distractions dur-
ing password entry.
• Mental workload status: A relatively complex CRT task
appears every time when a participant presses a response key.
This task is used to create continuing mental workload during
password entry.
Among six conditions, we referred to the combination of relaxed
mode and no-extra-task status as the normal condition, which is
the common condition usually tested in prior work [19, 27, 38, 39,
5, 26, 33, 13, 15, 24, 8, 7]. The short names for the other ﬁve
conditions are given in Table 1.
Short name Full speciﬁcation
normal relaxed mode + no-extra-task status
timed timed mode + no-extra-task status
distraction relaxed mode + distraction status
distraction+timed timed mode + distraction status
mental workload relaxed mode + mental workload status
mental workload+timed timed mode + mental workload status
Table 1: Short names for test conditions
The hypotheses related to these test conditions are described as
follows.
(H1) Compared to the normal condition, login time will be signiﬁ-
cantly shorter when time pressure is present.
(H2) Compared to the normal condition, login accuracy will be
signiﬁcantly lower when time pressure is present.
(H3) Compared to the normal condition, login time will be signiﬁ-
cantly longer when unexpected distraction is present.
(H4) Compared to the normal condition, login accuracy will be
signiﬁcantly lower when unexpected distraction is present.
(H5) Compared to the normal condition, login time will be signiﬁ-
cantly longer when persistent mental workload is present.
(H6) Compared to the normal condition, login accuracy will be
signiﬁcantly lower when persistent mental workload is present.
(H7) Compared to a condition in relaxed mode with secondary
tasks, login time will be signiﬁcantly shorter for its counterpart
in timed mode.
(H8) Compared to a condition in relaxed mode with secondary
tasks, login accuracy will be signiﬁcantly lower for its counterpart
in timed mode.
5.3 Learning Curve
Although our scheme design involves intuitive operations only, it
requires a different process for password entry compared to legacy
passwords. While we expect the participants can learn this process
with the tutorial and pretests, we observed that some participants
were impatient to read all instructions and keep pressing the next
button. These participants proceeded to the evaluation stage before
they fully understand our scheme design.
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Figure 6: Learning curve of our schemes
Figure 6 compares user performance under the normal condition
for different positions where a scheme appears in the study. These
results show the user performance in terms of login time and login
success rates is signiﬁcantly worse when the tested scheme is the
ﬁrst scheme which a participant encountered in the user study. But
the differences on user performance are not signiﬁcant if a scheme
is encountered as the second or third test group, as all our schemes
are similar due to the fact that they are based on the same con-
ceptual design. As shown in the learning curve in Figure 6, most
participants get familiar with our scheme design after the ﬁrst test
group. Therefore, we consider the ﬁrst test group as part of the
learning process, and use the performance data collected from the
second and third test groups only in the following analysis.
5.4 Experimental Results
We measure user performance with the following metrics: aver-
age login time, login success rates, round success rates, and average
edit distances. A round success rate is the average success rate for a
user to correctly input one password element by applying a hidden
transformation. An edit distance is the minimum number of inser-
tions, deletions, substitutions, and adjacent transpositions required
to transform an input string into the correct password string so that
an average edit distance is the average value of edit distances cal-
culated from all login attempts of a user under a test condition.
Among these metrics, login success rates, round success rates, and
average edit distances are used to evaluate login accuracy.
We use the following statistical tools to test the signiﬁcance of
our experimental results, where a signiﬁcance level of α = .05 is
used. For each comparison, we run an omnibus test across all test
conditions for each scheme. Since all our performance data are
quantitative, we use Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test for omnibus tests,
which is an analogue of ANOVA but does not require normality.
If the omnibus test indicates signiﬁcance, we further use Mann-
Whitney (MW) U test to perform pair-wise comparisons so as to
identify speciﬁc pairs with signiﬁcant differences. The detailed re-
sults of our statistical tests are given in Appendix A.
5.4.1 Performance under Normal Condition
In the normal condition, a participant is only asked to perform
login tasks without any time pressure or secondary tasks. It corre-
sponds to the combination of relaxed mode and no-extra-task sta-
tus, which is used as a baseline in our tests.
Figure 7(a) shows the average time for a successful login attempt
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Figure 7: Average login time, success rate, and edit distance under the normal condition
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Figure 8: Impact of time pressure
in the normal condition. For all the three schemes, most partici-
pants are able to ﬁnish the login within 13 seconds. Figure 7(b)
and 7(c) show the corresponding login accuracy. Since our experi-
ment limits the number of login attempts to 5 in order to prevent the
participants from feeling exhausted or bored, even a single mistake
would take the login success rate down to 80%. Our results indicate
that most participants make at most one mistake when they use our
schemes for the ﬁrst time after a short training. This is shown by
97.5% average round success rate and 0.13 average edit distance
in the worst case. Particularly, for the distribution of average edit
distance of NumPad-Shift, 27 participants among 40 samples (after
removing the experimental data when NumPad-Shift appears as the
ﬁrst test group) has an average edit distance of zero (i.e. no mis-
takes during all tests under the test condition), which are shown as
a cluster of outliers at the bottom of the box chart. The login accu-
racy is expected to increase after the participants get more familiar
with the schemes.
5.4.2 Inﬂuence of Time Pressure
Figure 8 shows the impact of time pressure without any sec-
ondary tasks. The results show that the participants behave much
hastily in the presence of time pressure. The average time for a
successful login attempt becomes shorter and the login accuracy is
decreased. The statistical tests show the difference in login time
is signiﬁcant (p=.017 for NumPad-Add and p<.001 for LetterPad-
Shift) but the difference in login accuracy is not. Therefore, H1 is
supported while H2 is not.
The insigniﬁcant results in login accuracy are due to the ceil-
ing effect [1], which implies the tests are not sufﬁciently difﬁcult
to distinguish the inﬂuence of different test conditions. This effect
could be caused by our scheme design, which is not difﬁcult for
the participants to use so that the majority of the participants did
not make any mistakes during all the tests. This effect will be fur-
ther discussed in Appendix A. However, even without statistical
signiﬁcance, we still observe the average results of login accuracy
become worse for all three tested schemes. Considering the simple
design of our schemes, this indicates that time pressure may have a
larger inﬂuence on the login accuracy of a more complex scheme.
5.4.3 Inﬂuence of Distraction
Figure 9 shows the impact of distraction without time pressure.
Many participants made a mistake when they saw a distraction task
for the ﬁrst time (however, NumPad-Shift is an exception). For
NumPad-Add and LetterPad-Shift shown in Figure 9(b), the round
success rate returns to a comparable level as the normal condi-
tion, after the ﬁrst time the distraction task appears. This indicates
that the distraction task is no longer a surprise for the participants.
However, even after the participants get familiar with the distrac-
tion tasks, compared to the normal condition, the success rate is
still lower, the average edit distance is larger, and the average lo-
gin time is longer. But the statistical tests show these differences
are not signiﬁcant. Therefore, H3 and H4 are not supported in our
experiments.
5.4.4 Inﬂuence of Mental Workload
Figure 10 shows the impact of mental workload without time
pressure. The average login time becomes signiﬁcantly longer with
mental workload (p=.003 for NumPad-Add) due to context switch
in users’ mind between password inputs and secondary CRT tasks.
An extra startup time is required to release the central executive af-
ter each CRT task. Our experiment simulates the case when users
cannot get rid of other thoughts during password entry. The actual
effect of mental workload depends on the status of users’ mind.
The impact may be elevated when the actual mental workload is
higher than our CRT tasks. On the other hand, the login accu-
racy is lower compared to the normal condition but the difference
is not signiﬁcant due to the same ceiling effect mentioned in Sec-
tion 5.4.2. Therefore, H5 is supported and H6 is not. These results
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Figure 9: Impact of distraction
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Figure 10: Impact of mental workload
show that persistent mental workload signiﬁcantly slows the pro-
cess of password entry for our schemes.
5.4.5 Performance under Combined Conditions
We also examine the overall impact when distraction or mental
workload appears together with time pressure. As expected, com-
pared to their counterparts without time pressure, the average login
time becomes shorter (from 10.3 seconds to 11.7 seconds on av-
erage), the login success rate becomes even lower (from 81.3% to
87.5%), and the average edit distance becomes larger (from 0.151
to 0.243). The statistical tests show the difference in login time
is signiﬁcant (p=.009 for NumPad-Add, p=.019 for NumPad-Shift,
and p<.001 for LetterPad-Shift) and the difference in login accu-
racy is still not signiﬁcant due to the ceiling effect explained in
Section 5.4.2. Therefore, H7 is supported but H8 is not. These
results show time pressure is still an effective stimulus to speed
password entry even in the presence of secondary tasks.
5.4.6 Effectiveness of Secondary Tasks
Figure 11 shows the distribution of the accuracy rate which
represents the percentage of secondary tasks being correctly per-
formed by a participant under certain test condition. The overall
average accuracy rate is 98.3% across all these test conditions. It
implies that the participants did pay attention to these tasks, as they
were told that the performance of these tasks also contributes to
their scores in the ranking system. Therefore, these CRT tasks work
as intended in disturbing participants’ mind during password entry.
5.4.7 Memory Interference by Mental Calculation
Figure 12 shows how frequently a participant presses the “show
my password” button during all tests in a test group. Note that
the participants are not allowed to write down their assigned pass-
words, but they can always click that button in case they forgot
their passwords. The overall average value for the total number of
[Distraction Only] [Distraction+Timed] [Mental Workload Only] [Mental Workload+Timed]
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Figure 11: Accuracy rate of performing secondary tasks
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Figure 12: Total number of times for each participant to press
the “show my password” button
times to press the “show my password” button is only 0.31 across
all three test groups. As shown in Figure 12, most users did not use
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Figure 13: Perception of participants
this button during the tests. This implies that the mental calcula-
tion involved in the hidden transformation of our schemes does not
pose a signiﬁcant interference on participants’ capability of recall-
ing their passwords.
5.4.8 User Perception
Figure 13 shows the perception of participants collected from
questionnaires. The results indicate that the participants generally
feel that our schemes are secure and easy to use. While NumPad-
Add is the most popular, the other two schemes also have their
favorite users.
5.5 Comparison with Legacy Passwords
Table 2 gives a comparison between CoverPad and legacy pass-
words based on the usability-deployability-security metrics pro-
posed in [10], where a metric is not shown if neither our schemes
nor legacy passwords offer corresponding beneﬁt. We have the fol-
lowing observations in comparison. 1) Our schemes are rated as not
mature since they are just proposed and have not been widely de-
ployed. 2) Our schemes are not server-compatible, as most current
servers support only static and replayable passwords, which could
be changed in the near future. 3) Our schemes are quasi-resilient-
to-internal-observation in a sense that any key logger or malware
which fails to capture the hidden transformation causes no pass-
word leakage. Overall, this table shows that our schemes signiﬁ-
cantly improve the security strength while retaining most beneﬁts
of legacy passwords.
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CoverPad
Schemes
• • ◦ ◦ • • • • • • ◦ ◦ • • • •
Legacy
Passwords
• • • ◦ • • • • • • • ◦ • • • •
Table 2: Comparison between CoverPad and legacy passwords
using usability-deployability-security metrics [10]. • = offer the
beneﬁt, ◦ = almost offer the beneﬁt, no circle = does not offer
the beneﬁt
6. DISCUSSION
6.1 Eavesdropping Attacks
Eavesdropping attacks such as vision-based eavesdropping may
require the physical presence of an adversary, which limits the scale
of their threat. However, the scale of attacks is not the only fac-
tor that determines the impact of attacks, which is also decided by
the severity of potential losses. If a victim is an important person
in a company, password leakage may lead to disclosing sensitive
corporate data, which would provide sufﬁcient incentives to an ad-
versary. While internal attacks such as malware and logic key log-
ger could be prevented by properly updating and conﬁguring the
computing system [30, 3, 6, 37] used by the victim, it is difﬁcult
to effectively mitigate the threat of external eavesdropping attacks
due to inevitable exposure of human-computer interaction during
the entry of legacy passwords. This threat becomes more serious in
scenarios when a mobile device is used in public places.
Nevertheless, the threat of external eavesdropping attacks can
be effectively mitigated with CoverPad. Besides enhanced secu-
rity features, our scheme retains most beneﬁts of legacy passwords
and can be implemented on commodity devices. Our scheme is not
only applicable to mobile devices but also other devices equipped
with touch screen. For example, many ATM machines have been
deployed with touch screen. Our scheme can be deployed on these
machines to mitigate the threat of the ATM skimming attack [25].
6.2 Device Screen Size
Although we implement our scheme on Apple iPad, it could be
easily adapted to other screen sizes, as illustrated in Figure 14. For
a mobile phone with a small touch screen like Apple iPhone, a user
can use a handA to perform the hand-shielding gesture, and use the
other handB to hold the phone. The thumb on handB can be used
to press the response keys. For a mobile phone with a larger touch
screen like Samsumg Galaxy Note II, a user may not be able to
click all the keys with the thumb of hand B that holds the device.
To deal with this situation, he only needs to use one hand A to
perform the hand-shielding gesture and key pressing sequentially.
Once the user raises his hand before pressing a key, the hidden
transformation immediately disappears because the gesture is no
longer detected by the touch screen. Meantime, the user does not
need to worry about whether the actual keys pressed or the ﬁnger
movements during key pressing may be observed by an adversary,
as the sequence of pressed keys alone does not leak any information
about the underlying password as analyzed in Section 4.
6.3 Limitations
Ecological validity is a challenging issue in any user study. Like
most prior research [19, 27, 26, 15, 24], our experiments engage
only university students. These participants are younger and more
educated compared to the general population. Therefore, usability
evaluation may vary with other populations. Our experiments are
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Figure 14: Conceptual demonstration on a small screen device
also restricted by the sample size, which may affect the results of
statistical tests. Typical examples are the insigniﬁcant results on
the login accuracy of our schemes. Moreover, our user study does
not include experiments on memory effects (e.g. forgetting). Since
our scheme uses the same alphabet and password composition as
legacy passwords, the users may use the same coping strategies
to help themselves to memorize the passwords in our scheme. The
impact of memory effects on the user performance would be similar
to legacy passwords as shown in the prior literature [14, 34].
7. RELATED WORK
In this section, we summarize closely related work on achieving
leakage resilience of password entry in three different aspects.
Although the problem of achieving leakage resilience of pass-
word entry was proposed two decades ago [29], it is still a chal-
lenge to design a practical solution till now. Early work in this
direction [19, 27, 38, 39, 5] focused on designing schemes solely
rely on the cognitive capability of human beings. Unfortunately, all
such schemes with acceptable usability have been broken [27, 38,
39, 5]. Recent investigations [11, 40] provided strong evidence for
the necessity to construct a protected environment to hide certain
user interaction during password entry in order to achieve both se-
curity and usability. The establishment of such protected environ-
ment may require the features only available from new user inter-
face technologies. A few schemes [26, 33, 13, 15, 24, 8, 7] were de-
signed in this strategy. Among them, our scheme design was mostly
inspired by the concept of physical metaphor introduced in [24].
Our scheme distinguishes itself from prior work in the sense that
it not only achieves leakage resilience but also retains most ben-
eﬁts of legacy passwords, while some of prior schemes [33, 15]
are ﬂawed in terms of security, and the others incur extra usabil-
ity costs due to various reasons including: 1) using an uncommon
device such as gaze tracker [26, 13], haptic motor [8], and large
pressure-sensitive screen [24], 2) requiring an extra accessory de-
vice [7], and 3) inoperable in a non-stationary environment [8].
On the other hand, the procedure of applying random transfor-
mations on a ﬁxed password used in our scheme design is a clas-
sic idea to prevent password leakage, but it is not easy to be re-
alized in a human-friendly manner without the new user interface
technologies, which are only available on modern computing de-
vices. These new technologies give our scheme advantages when
compared to recently patented schemes. Take GridCode [17] as
an example, which asks users to memorize extra secrets (besides
the passwords) in order to perform the transformations speciﬁed in
its scheme design, while our scheme does not have such require-
ment. Another advantage of our scheme is that each character of
the password uses a different hidden transformation during an au-
thentication attempt, while GridCode uses the same transformation
for all the characters in the password. If a hidden transformation in
GridCode is disclosed, the entire password will be exposed. How-
ever, if a hidden transformation in our scheme is disclosed, only
the single character associated with the transformation will be ex-
posed. These two fundamental differences show both security and
usability advantages of our scheme.
In terms of design principles, Roth et al. [32] proposed to use a
cognitive trapdoor game to transform the knowledge of the under-
lying password into obfuscated responses. Li and Shum [27] later
suggested three other principles including time-variant responses,
randomness in challenges and responses, and indistinguishability
against statistical analysis. Yan et al. [40] further extended the cov-
erage by including the design principles against brute force attacks,
and provided concrete guidelines against generic statistical attacks.
Our proposed scheme follows all these design principles to avoid
corresponding security ﬂaws.
Bonneau et al. [10] recently proposed a generic framework for
evaluating user authentication proposals and emphasized the im-
portance of retaining the beneﬁts of legacy passwords. Their frame-
work introduced twenty-ﬁve beneﬁts covering usability, deploya-
bility and security. This framework is used in our study to guide
the scheme design in retaining the beneﬁts of legacy passwords.
Other research on password-based user authentication can be found
in a recent survey paper [9], which summarized the development of
new password schemes in the past decade.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a leakage-resilient password entry
scheme leveraging on the touch screen feature of mobile devices.
It improves leakage resilience while preserving most beneﬁts of
legacy passwords. Three variants of this scheme were imple-
mented. The practicability of our scheme was evaluated in an ex-
tended user study that incorporates new experiments to examine the
inﬂuence of additional test conditions related to time pressure, dis-
traction, and mental workload. These conditions were tested for the
ﬁrst time in the evaluation of user authentication schemes. Among
these conditions, time pressure and mental workload were shown
to have signiﬁcant impacts on user performance. Therefore, we
suggest including these conditions in the evaluation of user authen-
tication schemes in the future research.
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APPENDIX
A. STATISTICAL TEST RESULTS
In this section, we provide the detailed results of statistical tests.
Table 3 shows the results for login time, which indicates that the
same test condition may have difference impact on the login time
of different schemes.
Average login time of NumPad-Add - omnibus KW χ25=32.423, p<.001
normal (10.4) timed (9.2) U=551, p=.017
distraction (11.2) U=679, p=.184
distraction+timed (10.3) U=878, p=.989
mental workload (11.8) U=515, p=.003
mental workload+timed (10.7) U=696, p=.319
distraction (11.2) distraction+timed (10.3) U=718, p=.107
mental workload (11.8) mental workload+timed (10.7) U=558, p=.009
Average login time of NumPad-Shift - omnibus KW χ25=11.965, p=.034
normal (11.7) timed (11.2) U=666, p=.199
distraction (13.5) U=645, p=.137
distraction+timed (11.7) U=727, p=.485
mental workload (13.3) U=655, p=.164
mental workload+timed (11.4) U=644, p=.135
distraction (13.5) distraction+timed (11.7) U=565, p=.024
mental workload (13.3) mental workload+timed (11.4) U=555, p=.019
Average login time of LetterPad-Shift - omnibus KW χ25=49.252, p<.001
normal (13.2) timed (10.1) U=294, p<.001
distraction (13.6) U=774, p=.667
distraction+timed (11.0) U=413, p<.001
mental workload (13.4) U=653, p=.116
mental workload+timed (11.5) U=472, p=.002
distraction (13.6) distraction+timed (11.0) U=422, p<.001
mental workload (13.4) mental workload+timed (11.5) U=631, p=.075
Table 3: The results of statistical tests for login time (sec). All
pairwise tests areMann-Whitney U. The statistically signiﬁcant
results are marked with.
The results of statistical tests on login accuracy are not shown as
none of them indicate signiﬁcance. This is caused by the ceiling ef-
fect, which can be observed from the data shown in Table 4. Even
in the worst case, 50.0% participants did not make any mistakes
during all tests in the test condition, which implies our tests are not
sufﬁciently difﬁcult to distinguish these test conditions regarding
their inﬂuence on the login accuracy of our schemes. This could be
caused by the simple design of our schemes such that they are easy
to use even in the presence of time pressure, distraction, and mental
workload. However, it does not necessarily imply that these factors
will not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the login accuracy of other user au-
thentication schemes. Since the average results of login accuracy
are observed to be worse due to the presence of these factors in our
tests, we expect they would have a more signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
other schemes with higher complexity.
NumPad-Add NumPad-Shift LetterPad-Shift
normal 82.9% 67.5% 75.6%
timed 78.0% 62.5% 53.7%
distraction 80.5% 70.0% 63.4%
distraction+timed 70.7% 55.0% 58.5%
mental workload 75.6% 57.5% 65.9%
mental workload+timed 65.9% 50.0% 51.2%
Table 4: Evidence for the ceiling effect in statistical tests on
login accuracy. Each cell in this table shows the percentages
of the participants who did not make any mistakes in a test
condition.
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